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DADS ARE PARENTS, TOO: WHY AMENDING
THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT IS
NECESSARY FOR COURTS TO DETERMINE IF
A PARENTAL LEAVE POLICY VIOLATES
TITLE VII
ABSTRACT
To attract millennials desiring a work-life balance, large companies
have begun to offer new parent leave to both male and female employees
and commonly offer longer leave to women than men. Although a company
may offer pregnancy disability leave to women without offering similar
leave to men, if the company classifies the leave as parental bonding leave,
it must be offered equally. If it is not, as highlighted by recent lawsuits
against JP Morgan and Estée Lauder, a Title VII claim can arise.
Historically, courts have had difficulty deciding if such a policy does in fact
violate Title VII, because local courts, the United States Supreme Court,
and the EEOC offer conflicting views on how long pregnancy disability
leave may be before it becomes parental bonding leave. This Note calls on
Congress to amend the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to clearly define the
length of pregnancy leave and parental leave that employers must offer to
comply with Title VII.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is the only industrialized country that does not
require employers to offer paid parental leave. 1 Instead, employers must
create their own parental leave policies.2 For nearly four decades, the lack
of clear federal guidelines for parental leave policies has caused employers
to struggle to create competitive leave policies that comply with Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 Title VII 4 was enacted to eradicate
employment discrimination and, consequently, proscribes discriminatory
conduct that would deprive an employee of equal employment opportunities

1. See Rebecca A. Brusca, A Comprehensive Analysis of the Effects of Paid Parental Leave in
the U.S., 19 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 75, 75 (2017); Sara Cohen, Note, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too:
How Paid Maternity Leave in the United States Could End the Choice Between Career &
Motherhood, 36 WOMAN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 1, 1 (2014); see also Samantha Jean Quan Forsyth,
Note, Bringing Up Baby Under the FMLA: How the Federal Unpaid Maternity Leave System in
the United States Will Not Carry to Term, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 380, 380 (2018)
(“Only two of the 185 countries and territories studied by the International Labour Organization
do not have [paid maternity leave]: Papua New Guinea and the United States of America.”).
2. See Brusca, supra note 1, at 75.
3. See Christen Linke Young, Childbearing, Childrearing, and Title VII: Parental Leave
Policies at Large American Law Firms, 188 YALE L.J. 1182, 1197, 1184, 1210 (2009).
4. Throughout this Note, “Title VII” refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
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and benefits. 5 Thus, although the United States does not require employers
to offer parental leave, if an employer does offer this benefit, it must be
offered equally to men and women. 6 In recent years, some employers have
begun to offer parents substantial leave after the birth of a child. Policies
vary by employer and range from a few weeks to a few months.7 Regardless
of length, however, almost all policies offer longer leave to mothers than
fathers. 8
As highlighted by lawsuits brought by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 9 against JP Morgan 10 and Estée
Lauder 11 in Summer 2017, employers are increasingly uncertain as to
whether parental leave policies that offer longer leave to mothers than
fathers violate Title VII. Both of these companies attempted to comply with
Title VII by offering seemingly gender-neutral parental leave policies that
determined leave time not by sex, but rather by the parent’s classification as
either the “primary” or “secondary” caregiver.12 In both cases, the plaintiffs
alleged that the leave policies violated Title VII because, under the policies,
women were automatically given longer leave than men since they were
presumed to be their child’s primary caregiver. 13
It is well established by federal courts that employers may offer leave to
a mother after the birth of a child without offering leave to a father, so long
5. Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal Opportunities and AntiDiscrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 26, 27 (2011).
6. See Young, supra note 3, at 1210.
7. Rachel Gillet, 19 Companies That Offer Some of the Best Parental Leave Policies in
America, BUS. INSIDER (May 7, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-best-parental-leavepolicies-in-america-2016-5.
8. See id.
9. The EEOC is the government administrative agency responsible for investigating
employment discrimination. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.ee
oc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).
10. See EEOC Charge of Discrimination by Derek Rotondo, ACLU, at 1 (June 14,
2017), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/eeoc-charge-derek-rotondo (last visited Oct. 27,
2018) [hereinafter Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner].
11. Charge by Petitioner at 6, E.E.O.C. v. Estee Lauder, No. 2:17-cv-03897-JP, 2017 WL
3730882, at *1–2, *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017) [hereinafter EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by
Petitioner]. On July 17, 2018 Estée Lauder entered a settlement in this matter for $1.1 million. Id.
In addition to the cash settlement, the settlement decree requires Estée Lauder to “administer
parental leave and related return-to-work benefits in a manner that ensures equal benefits for male
and female employees and utilizes sex-neutral criteria, requirements, and processes.” Id. Estée
Lauder met this requirement prior to the settlement decree by implementing new parental leave
standards. The company now provides all eligible employees, regardless of gender, with twenty
weeks of child bonding time and six weeks of flexible work schedule once returning to work. Id.
For biological mothers, this time is additional to medical leave associated with childbirth. See
Press Release, EEOC, Estée Lauder to Pay $1.1 Million to Settle EEOC Class Sex Discrimination
Lawsuit (July 17, 2018), https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-17-18c.cfm.
12. Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner, at 1; EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by
Petitioner, supra note 11, at 6.
13. Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner, at 1; EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by
Petitioner, supra note 11, at 6.
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as the leave is classified as pregnancy disability leave. 14 Courts have made
clear, however, that there is a distinction between pregnancy disability
leave, which may be offered to a woman during pregnancy and after birth,
and generic parental leave, which can be given to both parents after birth.15
If an employer chooses to classify leave as parental leave, the leave time
must be offered equally to both parents. 16 This distinction is the key issue in
the cases brought against JP Morgan and Estée Lauder. 17 At first, it would
seem that employers desiring to offer longer leave to female employees
than male employees would simply need to classify the leave given to
women as pregnancy disability leave to comply with Title VII since
pregnancy disability leave can be given to women without offering any
leave to men. Unfortunately, creating such a policy is difficult because there
is no clear federal standard defining the acceptable length of pregnancy
disability leave. 18 The purpose of pregnancy disability leave, however, is to
take into account the disability associated with pregnancy. 19 Therefore, a
woman cannot be given pregnancy disability leave when she is no longer
disabled from pregnancy. There is currently no standard stating how long
this disability period is, and consequentially, at what point a woman is no
longer taking disability leave to recover from birth. In fact, not only is there
no standard, but the Supreme Court, 20 circuit courts, 21 and EEOC 22 offer
conflicting opinions as to what the acceptable length of pregnancy disability
leave should be, ranging from six weeks to one year. 23 Without a clear
national standard, employers are unable to determine the length of
pregnancy disability leave they can offer a female employee before they

14. See Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 742 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (noting that
federal courts “give great deference . . . to EEOC regulations issued in furtherance of Title VII”
and, “[a]ccording to EEOC interpretations, Title VII prohibits covered employers from providing
any caregiving leave to mothers if the employer does not also provide commensurate leave to
fathers . . . . [A]n employer may provide pregnancy disability leave to mothers without providing
leave to fathers if mothers are entitled to leave pursuant to their disability, not their sex. Therefore
. . . if an employer provides caregiving leave to mothers, it must offer equal caregiving leave to
fathers.”).
15. See id. at 744.
16. Schafer, 903 F.2d at 250.
17. See Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner, at 1; EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by
Petitioner, supra note 11, at 9.
18. Employers in the United States are not required to offer pregnancy disability leave. See
Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
19. See id.
20. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279 (1987).
21. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
22. Id. at 742.
23. See id. at 741. Traditionally, the medical community has recommended that a woman’s
body needs at least six weeks to recover from childbirth, as this is the time it takes her
reproductive organs to return to their non-pregnant state. See Pat McGovern et al., Postpartum
Health of Employed Mothers 5 Weeks After Childbirth, 4 ANNALS FAM. MED. 159, 159 (2006).
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must also offer comparable parental leave to men. 24 Consequently,
companies struggle to create policies that comply with Title VII. 25
This Note argues that two levels of change are necessary for companies
like JP Morgan and Estée Lauder to create parental leave policies that
certainly will comply with Title VII. First, Congress must amend the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) codified in Title VII to establish a
clear national standard that states the length of acceptable pregnancy
disability leave employers may offer new mothers. Second, employers must
eliminate parental leave policies that distinguish between primary and
secondary caregivers and that automatically consider women to be the
primary caregiver. Employers that have such a policy should replace it with
a policy that offers longer pregnancy disability leave to women and equal
parental leave time to men.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of parental leave policies in
the United States and federal laws that address these policies, specifically
the formation of the landmark PDA. 26 Part II discusses the ways an
employer may violate Title VII by offering or not offering certain parental
leave benefits. Part III analyzes the ways employers may offer parental
leave policies that include a longer disability leave period to new mothers
and still comply with Title VII. Part IV argues that amending the PDA is
the only way to clarify the length of required pregnancy disability leave.
Part V address why current federal legislation, such as the Family Medical
Leave Act, is inadequate to address this problem. Part VI addresses the
current state of maternity leave laws. Finally, Part VII addresses the
reasons employers currently do not offer parental leave policies that comply
with Title VII and calls on Congress to amend the PDA to clearly define the
length of pregnancy disability leave and parental leave that employers must
offer to comply with Title VII.
I. HISTORY OF PARENTAL LEAVE LAWS
Passed in 1964, the Civil Rights Act (the Act) contains eleven titles that
protect individuals from various discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 27 Title VII of the Act specifically protects
individuals from employment discrimination. Section 703(a) provides broad
protections against discrimination in all aspects of employment: “It shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
24. See id. at 742 (noting the conflicting viewpoints of acceptable disability leave length
offered by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and the EEOC).
25. See id. at 745.
26. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C § 2000e(k) (2012).
27. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 126 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 8th ed.
2015).
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of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or
national origin . . . .” 28
The constitutionality of the Act was challenged almost immediately
after it passed. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court held that Congress had the authority to enact the
Civil Rights Act by the powers granted to it by the Commerce Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Heart of Atlanta was one of the first cases to
challenge the Act and specifically challenged Title II, which grants
individuals the right to “the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
accommodation . . . without discrimination on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin.” 30 In Heart of Atlanta, a motel in Georgia
refused to rent rooms to African American customers.31 The motel was
located near a major highway, advertised on over fifty billboards, and also
advertised in other states. 32 The plaintiff argued that the Act deprived the
hotel of its liberty to conduct business as it wished because the hotel was
not free to choose its own customers, and therefore, the Act forced the
motel into involuntary servitude.33 Therefore, the plaintiff argued, the Act
exceeded the authority of Congress and was unconstitutional. 34 The
Supreme Court disagreed. 35 The Court held that the determinative test of
whether Congress may regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause is
simply “whether the activity sought to be regulated is commerce which
concerns more states than one and has a real and substantial relation to the
national interest.” 36 Under this test, the Court held that Congress had a valid
interest in regulating hospitality segregation because it was in the national
interest to ensure that interstate travelers could find lodging. 37 The Court
explained that studies by Congress had found that African Americans
frequently traveled between states, and the inability to secure
accommodations prevented them from easily traveling. 38 Congressional
intervention, therefore, was necessary to allow them to easily migrate
between states. 39
Although Heart of Atlanta Motel addressed Title II specifically, it
nonetheless provided protections to the other sections of the Act, including
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
29. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 127; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305

(1964).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
31. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 244.
34. Id. at 243.
35. Id. at 261–62.
36. Id. at 255.
37. Id. at 261.
38. Id. at 252.
39. Id. at 261.
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Title VII, because Americans often travel between states for employment
purposes. 40 Similar to the hotel that wanted the right to choose its customers
from the array of interstate travelers, employers want the freedom to choose
their own employees. 41 However, unlike the Supreme Court’s willingness to
step in and require a motel to serve certain customers that it did not want to
serve, legislators and judges are more “reluctant to infringe on the
employer’s managerial prerogatives” in regards to the employer’s hiring
and firing practices. 42 Therefore, it is important to note that Title VII does
not require employers to hire anyone. 43 Instead, the Act plays a negative
role in employee selection. That is, employers may hire employees based on
whatever factors they choose; it only prohibits employer action that is
improperly motivated by a discriminatory intent or has unacceptable
discriminatory consequences. 44
The Act has been amended four times. 45 First, in 1972 it was amended
to increase the EEOC’s enforcement power; second, in 1978 it was
amended to include the PDA; third, in 1991, it was amended to overrule a
Supreme Court decision clarifying the burden of proof required in a claim
and adding compensatory and punitive damages as forms of relief; and
finally, in 2009, it was amended to expand a plaintiff’s ability to recover for
pay discrimination. 46 Most important to this Note is the 1978 amendment
adding the PDA. 47
The PDA was passed in response to the public outrage at the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Geduldig v. Aiello 48 and General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert. 49 Geduldig challenged the constitutionality of the California
disability insurance program that excluded disabilities attributed to
pregnancy from disability coverage. 50 The suit was brought by four women
who were told they could not receive coverage under the program. 51 Three
of the women had experienced complications during pregnancy and
childbirth, and one was classified as having a normal pregnancy and
childbirth. 52 Under the program, California workers contributed a portion of
each paycheck to the state disability fund. 53 Employees were told that they
could receive a “weekly benefit amount” if they became temporarily
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 127.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C § 2000e (2012).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 484 (1974).
See Young, supra note 3, at 1212–13; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 183.
See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 488–89.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 487–88.
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disabled from working and their illness or injury was not covered by
workmen’s compensation. 54 However, Section 2626 of the Unemployment
Insurance Code specifically excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from
coverage. 55 The Code stated, “[i]n no case shall the term ‘disability’ or
‘disabled’ include any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection
with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of
28 days thereafter.” 56 The United States Court for the Northern District of
California held that the Code violated the Equal Protection Clause because
the Code purposefully excluded a medical condition that could apply only
to women, and there was no “rational and substantial relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.” 57 However, the United States Supreme Court
reversed. 58 Ten days before the appellate court ruling in Geduldig,
California’s highest court had held that disability relating to complications
of pregnancy and childbirth may be covered by the program. 59 Therefore,
the only question the United States Supreme Court considered was if a
woman who had experienced normal pregnancy and childbirth without
complications could receive disability benefits from the program. 60 The
Court upheld the prohibition against women with normal pregnancy
because the State had the legitimate interest of maintaining the program. 61
Specifically, the Court reasoned that if the program had to accommodate a
disability as common as a pregnancy, it would be “hard to perceive why it
would not also compel payments for short-term disabilities suffered by
participating employees” and consequently, the program would no longer
be able to exist. 62
Similarly, in General Electric, the Supreme Court considered whether
an employer’s benefit plan that offered nonoccupational accident and
sickness benefits, but excluded pregnancy, violated Title VII. 63 Both the
district court and the appellate court found that it did, reasoning that
pregnancy could only affect women, and therefore, violated Section
703(a)(1) of Title VII. 64 The Supreme Court relied on its analysis in
Geduldig, and once again held that a policy that excludes pregnancy is not
sex discrimination under Title VII. 65 Following its reasoning in Geduldig,
the Court reasoned that the policy was not discriminatory because it “does
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 488–89.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 490; see generally Rentzer v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 32 Cal. App.
3d 604 (1973).
60. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 491–92.
61. See id. at 495–96.
62. Id. at 496.
63. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976).
64. Id. at 125, 127.
65. Id. at 136.
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not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely
removes one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable
disabilities.” 66 Furthermore, the Court held that when Congress passed Title
VII, it knew pregnancy was a condition that only affects women but chose
not to list pregnancy as a protected class. 67 Therefore, Congress did not
intend pregnant women to be a class protected against employment
discrimination when it passed Title VII. 68
The dissent in General Electric disagreed that pregnancy was merely a
nondiscriminatory medical condition, because pregnancy is a condition that
can only affect women. 69 Specifically, Justice Stevens reasoned that the
policy did discriminate on the basis of sex by providing protection for men
in all categories of risk that they may experience, but only gave women
partial protection against the medical conditions that they may experience. 70
Thus, Justice Stevens reasoned that the employer had created a condition
where employment of females was less favorable than the employment of
males, which was exactly a situation Title VII sought to prevent. 71
Congress adamantly opposed the reasoning and holding of the majority
in General Electric, and determined a bill would be necessary to “reestablish the principles of Title VII law as they had been understood prior to
the [General Electric] decision.” 72 Both the House Report and Senate
Report quoted passages from the dissenting opinion in General Electric and
stated that these opinions best expressed the “correct” meaning of Title
VII. 73 During debates, proponents of the legislation stressed that Congress
had always intended Title VII to protect all individuals from discrimination,
including pregnant workers. 74
To protect pregnant workers, Congress passed the PDA in 1978. 75
Instead of providing a different cause of action for pregnancy
discrimination claims, the PDA incorporated pregnancy, childbirth, and
related medical conditions into the Title VII “sex discrimination” definition
section, thus providing pregnant employees with the same protections
afforded to the other classes under Title VII. 76 The definition of “sex
discrimination” now reads:
[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 162 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679 (1983).
Id. at 678.
Id. at 681.
Saur M. Matambanadzo, Reconstructing Pregnancy, 69 SMU L.J. 187, 188 (2016).
Id. at 205.
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medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work. . . .” 77

Consequently, the PDA supersedes Geduldig and General Electric by
providing protection for pregnant workers in two ways. 78 First, the Act
expands the definition of sex discrimination to include “discrimination on
the basis of sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 79
Second, the PDA requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same
as those who are not pregnant, but are similarly unable to work. 80 This
includes the right to fringe benefits, such as disability leave. 81 Therefore, if
an employer offers paid disability to recover from other non-pregnancyrelated illnesses and injuries, it must also offer paid disability leave to
women recovering from childbirth. 82
II. TITLE VII VIOLATIONS
For an employment practice to violate Title VII, the employee alleging
discrimination must show that the policy is deliberately discriminatory, or
that a facially neutral policy is discriminatory in practice.83 The first
category of claims, known as discriminatory intent claims, focus on the
intent of the employer. 84 Here, a claimant must show that an employer
implemented a policy for the purpose of discriminating against a protected
class. 85 Because gender is a protected class under Title VII, an employment
policy may violate Title VII if it offers one parental leave policy
specifically for women and another specifically for men. 86 In order to make
a successful claim that an employer’s parental leave policies violate Title
VII under this approach, the employee must show that the difference in
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
Matambanadzo, supra note 75, at 205.
Id. at 205; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
See Matambanadzo, supra note 75, at 205.
See id.
See id.
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, at 132; Schafer v. Bd. of Public Educ. of School Dist., 903
F.2d 243, 247 (3d Cir. 1990); Lorraine Hafer O’Hara, Comment, An Overview of Federal and
State Protections for Pregnant Workers, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 757, 763 (1987).
84. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, at 132.
85. Id. at 132.
86. See Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 742 (S.D. Iowa 2004); see also Young,
supra note 3, at 1224 (noting that an employer may have a parental leave policy that “arguably
violate[s] Title VII” when it “offer[s] an extended disability leave that effectively provides a
childrearing benefit to women alone, or [disguises] gender bias in a primary caregiver leave
policy.”); Amanda Wingfield Goldman, Insights on Avoiding the “Parental Leave” Trap,
LAW360 (Jul. 3, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/938907 (“Current EEOC
guidance and jurisprudence support a policy that any leave offered beyond the time to recover
from pregnancy/childbirth must be equally offered to men and women.”).
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policy offerings to men and women was a pretext for sex discrimination and
the result of a purely discriminatory motive. 87 The Supreme Court has been
reluctant to find that employers violated Title VII under this approach. 88
The second category, known as disparate impact claims, focuses on the
consequences of an employer’s facially neutral policy. 89 This category of
claims focuses on “the consequences of employment practices and not
simply the motivation behind them.” 90 Under this approach, the employee
establishes a prima facie discrimination case by “showing that an
employer’s practice adversely affects a protected class to a greater degree
than other persons.” 91 For example, a parental leave policy, may be facially
neutral because it does not state that one leave policy is specifically for
women and another specifically for men. The policy may nonetheless may
be found to be discriminatory if it causes one gender to be adversely
protected by the leave policies but not the other.92 The specific facts of a
case will determine if a plaintiff has a discriminatory intent or adverse
impact claim, although, as previously mentioned, plaintiffs are more likely
to succeed on an adverse impact claim than a discriminatory intent claim. 93
After the PDA was passed, employers immediately struggled to create
pregnancy and parental leave policies that complied with Title VII. 94
Interestingly, one of the first plaintiffs to argue that their employer’s benefit
plan was discriminatory under the amended Title VII was a man. 95 In
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 96 one of the only
cases to address the PDA, 97 an employer amended its parental leave policy
on the effective date of the PDA in attempt to comply with the new Title
VII requirements. 98 Under the new policy, female employees would not
receive the same length of hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-related
disabilities as male employees received for non-pregnancy-related
disabilities. 99 However, the spouses of male employees were not entitled to
this policy change. 100 Therefore, under the new plan, all covered males,
whether employees or dependents, were treated the same, but female
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See O’Hara, supra note 83, at 763–64.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 765.
Id.
Id.
See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that a policy that is
not facially discriminatory, but discriminates in practice, violates Title VII).
93. See O’Hara, supra note 83, at 763.
94. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 671 (1983)
(noting an instance where a company amended its parental leave policies immediately after the
PDA was passed, but its policies were still found to be in violation of the statute).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 671.
97. See O’Hara, supra note 83, at 767.
98. See Newport News Shipbuilding, 682 F.2d at 670.
99. Id. at 671–72.
100. Id.
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dependents of male employees were treated differently from female
employees. 101 A male employee filed a Title VII discrimination charge with
the EEOC, alleging his employer’s benefit plan violated Title VII because it
covered all hospitalization stays of dependents of female employees, but not
all dependents of male employees.102 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia upheld the employer’s policy, reasoning that
the PDA intended to only protect female employees, not spouses of male
employees. 103 Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit 104 and the Supreme Court disagreed.105 The Supreme Court
explained that Congress did not erase the original prohibition against sex
discrimination by amending Title VII to protect pregnant workers. 106
Although the revised language of the statute specifically protected female
workers, Congress did not intend to mean men could not be discriminated
against on the basis of their sex. 107 The Supreme Court held that the benefit
plan violated Title VII because “[t]he sex of the spouse is always the
opposite of the sex of the employee, 108 it follows inexorably that
discrimination against a female spouse in the provision of fringe benefits is
also discrimination against male employees.” 109 This case is important to
our current analysis because it established that the PDA also affects a men’s
right to fringe benefits 110 related to pregnancy. Consequently, since parental
leave is a fringe benefit, this case also affects their rights to equal parental
leave. 111
Nearly thirty years after Newport, employers continue to struggle to
create fringe benefit policies that comply with Title VII. Great uncertainty
currently exists regarding the length of leave time employers must give new
parents to comply with Title VII, as evidenced by the JP Morgan 112 and
Estée Lauder lawsuits. 113 Employers traditionally categorize leave taken

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 672.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 684.
It is no longer true that an individual’s spouse is always the opposite gender. See
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (finding that same-sex couples have a
constitutional right to marry).
109. Newport News Shipbuilding, 682 F.2d at 684.
110. Christy Hopkins, Fringe Benefits: What They Are and How They Work, FIT SMALL BUS.,
May 8, 2017, https://fitsmallbusiness.com/fringe-benefits/.
111. See Barbara Gault et al., Paid Parental Leave in the United States: What the Data Tell Us
About Access, Usage and Economic and Health Benefits, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. 2
(2014), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2608&cont
ext=key_workplace.
112. Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner, at 1.
113. EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by Petitioner, supra note 11, at 6.
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after the birth of a child in two ways: parental leave and disability leave. 114
In general terms, parental leave, sometimes referenced in employer policies
as caregiver leave, encompasses the time a new parent spends bonding and
caring for their child. 115 Therefore, both men and women can take parental
leave. 116 Specifically, in the lawsuit filed against JP Morgan in Summer
2017, the plaintiff claimed that his employer’s policies violated Title VII
because female employees were given more parental leave than men. 117 In
contrast, disability leave focuses only on the time a woman spends
physically recovering from pregnancy and childbirth. 118 Accordingly, only
a woman who has given birth can take pregnancy-related disability leave. 119
One of the claims by the plaintiff in Estée Lauder was that his employer
gave excessive disability leave to women by providing medical leave and
“transition back to work leave” in addition to already giving women
extended parental leave. 120
III. PRIMARY CAREGIVER LEAVE THAT INCLUDES
PREGNANCY-RELATED DISABILITY LEAVE
A leave policy that includes both pregnancy disability leave and
caregiving leave, and thus gives longer leave time to women than men, may
be permissible. 121 Employers are permitted to give new mothers longer
disability leave to recover from pregnancy and childbirth. 122 Any leave
beyond this disability leave is considered parental leave and must be offered
equally to men and women. 123 If, however, an employer offers a policy in
which women receive both disability leave and parental leave, the employer
may be susceptible to a Title VII suit, as evidenced in Estée Lauder and JP
Morgan lawsuits. Currently, there is currently no federal guideline or
standard that designates how many weeks of leave an employer may give
for pregnancy-related disability. 124 This lack of a standard makes it difficult
114. See Schafer v. Board of Public Educ. of School Dist., 903 F.2d 243, 248 (1990) (analyzing
the difference between parental leave and disability leave policies).
115. Young, supra note 3, at 1191.
116. Id.
117. Charge Alleges Bank Broke Federal Law By Denying Fathers the Same Amount of Leave
Time As Mothers, ACLU (June 17, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/fathers-denied-paidparental-leave-jp-morgan-chase-file-sex-discrimination-complaint-eeoc.
118. Howard R. Flaxman, Family vs Profession? Responding to Childbirth and Parental Leave
Requests, 17 LAW PRAC. MGMT 31, 31 (1991) (“Pregnancy disability leave is a medical leave
given to female employees who cannot work because of pregnancy or pregnancy-related
conditions.”) ; see also Young, supra note 3, at 1220 (“employers are permitted by Title VII to
provide women with leave specifically for the period that they are incapacitated because of
pregnancy.”).
119. See Flaxman, supra note 118, at 31.
120. EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by Petitioner, supra note 11, at 6.
121. See Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 742 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 742; see also Brusca, supra note 1, at 78.
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for courts to determine if a parental leave policy that includes disability
leave in fact violates Title VII by not giving equal leave time to men. 125 It
makes it equally difficult for employers, such as Estée Lauder, to create
policies that align with Title VII. Therefore, Congress must amend Title
VII, specifically the PDA, to create a pregnancy disability leave standard.
This standard must clearly state how many weeks of disability leave an
employer may give a woman who has given birth. This way, courts and
employers will know that any leave beyond this standard disability length is
parental leave and thus must be offered equally to men and women.
Absent a clear federal statute, the Supreme Court, federal courts, and
the EEOC continue to disagree on the appropriate length of pregnancy
disability leave an employer may give a woman. 126 This is important,
because employers are allowed to give paid disability leave to mothers after
the birth of a child, but not fathers, and still be in compliance with Title
VII. 127 According to the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, the law
prohibits employers from “providing any caregiving leave to mothers if the
employer does not also provide commensurate leave to fathers.” 128 Under
this interpretation, the only way an employer can give longer paid leave to
mothers after the birth of a child, but not fathers, is through disability
leave. 129 Any leave beyond this disability leave period must be offered
equally to mothers and fathers. 130 Thus, a standard disability leave period
length is necessary to determine when disability leave ends and parental
leave begins. 131
It is difficult for employers to create and enforce policies that abide by
these requirements when they do not know the acceptable length of
disability leave they may provide a female employee who has recently
given birth. 132 In California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, 133 the Supreme
Court upheld a California law requiring employers to provide female
employees with an unpaid pregnancy leave for up to four months and then
reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave unless the job is
no longer available due to business necessity, and if the same job is not
available, the employer must make a good faith effort to place the employee
in a substantially similar job. 134 In that case, a loan association allowed
employees to take disability leave for a variety of reasons, including
125. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 742 (noting the conflicting views of the Supreme Court, lower
federal courts, and the EEOC regarding permissible pregnancy disability leave length).
126. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
127. Id. at 742.
128. Id. at 741; EEOC Compliance Manual, sec. 626.6.
129. See Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
134. Id.
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pregnancy. 135 However, the company reserved the right to terminate an
employee returning from leave if her position was no longer available. 136
When a female employee attempted to return to work after taking disability
leave, she was informed her job had been filled and there were no similar
positions available for her to fill. 137 She sued claiming the bank violated
state law because she was not reinstated, as required by the statute.138 In its
defense, the bank argued that the California state law requiring pregnancy
leave violated Title VII because it granted reinstatement of women, for a
condition that only women could experience, without requiring a
comparable reinstatement policy for men. 139 The district court agreed,
finding that the law was pre-empted by Title VII because it required sexbased “preferential treatment of female employees disabled by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 140 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court’s decision that the
law “discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common
sense” and the Supreme Court affirmed. 141 Specifically, the Supreme
Court’s majority noted that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated, “the PDA is a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may
not drop—not a ceiling above which it may not rise.” 142 The California
statute provided the baseline of acceptable disability leave, which the
legislature determined was an appropriate length for a woman to recover
from childbirth. However, under the Court’s reasoning, an employer may
give more time than this if they wish, because this standard is just the base
line. The Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, considered the “actual
physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions” and did not consider the “archaic or stereotypical notions about
pregnancy and the ability of pregnant workers.” 143 Yet, the Supreme Court
failed to reveal what analysis they used to determine the “actual physical
disability,” and set no guidelines for future courts to use to determine this
“actual physical disability.” 144
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion gave limited insight into what
factors the Supreme Court used to determine the length of the “actual
physical disability” a woman experiences as a result of pregnancy and
childbirth. 145 In his opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned that preferential
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 278.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 280.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 290.
See id.
Id. at 293.
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treatment is only permissible so long as it is consistent with the goal of Title
VII. 146 That is, “to achieve equality of employment opportunities and to
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of . . . employees over other employees.” 147 Following this reasoning, a
policy that grants leave in excess of the actual time it takes a woman to
recover from pregnancy and childbirth will not be upheld as permissible
disability leave. 148
Although the Supreme Court in Guerra established that disabilityrelated pregnancy leave of four weeks was based on the actual time of
physical disability, it failed to state what an “actual” or “reasonable length
of disability leave should be.” 149 The Court did not say how long or short a
“reasonable” leave must be. 150 In Schafer v. Board of Public Education, 151 a
teacher’s collective bargaining agreement stated, “all female teachers shall
be entitled to maternity leave” and also provided that female teachers could
take up to one year of unpaid leave after the birth of a child “for personal
reasons relating to childbearing or childrearing.” 152 Similar to the court in
Guerra, the Third Circuit considered the “actual time” of disability-related
to childbirth and concluded that one year was excessive, but gave no
guidance as to how it determined that this was excessive. 153
The EEOC has also failed to establish guidelines for courts or
employers to use to determine the actual length of disability. 154 In contrast
to the Supreme Court, which held in Guerra that pregnancy disability leave
may be given preferential treatment, the EEOC takes the position that
pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions, “shall be treated the
same as disability caused or contributed to by other medical conditions,
under any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan available in
connection with employment.” 155 This stands in direct contrast to the
Court’s ruling in Guerra, that disability related to pregnancy may receive
“preferential treatment.” 156

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 294.
Id. (citation omitted).
See id.
See id. at 290.
Id.
Schafer v. Board of Public Educ. of School Dist., 903 F.2d 243, 245 (1990).
Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 248.
Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 741–42 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
Id. at 741.
Id.
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IV. THE NEED FOR A CLEAR FEDERAL GUIDELINE
REGARDING APPROPRIATE PREGNANCY-RELATED
DISABILITY LEAVE LENGTH
Courts have expressed confusion and frustration in trying to decide the
appropriate length of pregnancy disability leave to determine if a Title VII
violation has occurred. 157 In Johnson v. University of Iowa, 158 the court
explained its difficulty in trying to decide an appropriate length of leave and
if the employer’s policy ultimately violated Title VII; due to the conflicting
approach of the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and the EEOC. 159 In that
case, a husband and wife were employed by the same university. 160 Prior
the birth of their child, both parents applied for leave. 161 Under the
university’s policy, the mother was entitled to six weeks of disability leave,
while the father could only take five days of caregiving leave. 162 The father
claimed this policy violated Title VII because it discriminated on the basis
of sex by determining leave time based on the employee’s sex.163 Although
his wife’s leave was classified by the university as disability leave, the
father claimed only the first four weeks of his wife’s leave should be
classified as such, because it only took her four weeks, not six, to physically
recover from childbirth. 164 Thus, the extra two weeks under the policy
should be classified as parental leave, and given equally to him and his
wife. 165 In trying to decide if the two-week difference was disability leave
or parental leave, the district court struggled to determine the length of
leave permitted, due to the incongruence between the EEOC, the Supreme
Court in Guerra, and the Third Circuit in Schafer. 166 Absent clear
guidelines, and because it was not discriminatory on its face, the district
court examined the case under a McDonnell Douglas framework. 167 Courts
use the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate Title VII discrimination
claims that lack evidence of discriminatory intent. 168 Under this framework,
once an employee establishes a prima facie case that a policy has a
disparate impact on members of a protected class, the burden then shifts to
the employer to show that there was a business necessity for this policy. 169
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734–35.
See id.
See id. at 741.
Id. at 744.
Jessica Bergin, Note, “Ability” Means Ability: An Ability-Centric Interpretation That
Reinvigorates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Protections for Pregnant Workers, 36
WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 36, 45–46 (2014).
169. Id. at 51–52.

2018]

Amending the Pregnancy Discrimination Act & Title VII

207

If the employer meets this burden, the burden then shifts back to the
employee to show that another policy would equally serve the employer’s
legitimate business interest without having the discriminatory effect of the
challenged policy. 170
In Johnson, the employee failed to meet the burden in the third step of
the framework. 171 The court explained that the stated purpose behind the
University’s leave policy was to, “permit parents who have care giving
responsibilities to have time off to spend with a child newly added to the
family.” 172 The court found this failed the first step because this statement
alone does not establish a discriminatory policy. 173 The plaintiff also failed
to show that the policy created a pretext for discrimination. 174 A plaintiff
may show pretext by showing that other similarly situated employees were
treated differently. Here, the plaintiff claimed he received different
treatment from his wife in regards to benefits. 175 In this case, the court
found that the employees were not similarly situated, because they worked
in different departments of the University, and one was a part-time
employee while the other was a full-time employee. 176 Given that the court
chose to follow the McDonnell Douglas framework to determine if a Title
VII violation had occurred, and because the plaintiff did not show a prima
facie discriminatory policy, or prove that he was similarly situated
compared to his wife, the court upheld the policy. 177 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 178
All of this litigation failed to establish an acceptable length of
pregnancy disability leave under Title VII. 179 These cases have created a
confusing gray area surrounding parental leave. The confusing current state
of pregnancy-related disability leave is: case law permits employers to give
longer pregnancy disability leave to women than to men, 180 this disability
leave must be less than a year but should take into account actual
disability—even though the Supreme Court in Guerra explained that
employers are not in a position to make this complicated determination of
“actual disability. 181 But the EEOC rejects this view and states pregnancy
disability leave should be the same length of disability leave given to

170.
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Id. at 52.
Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 745 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
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Id. at 732.
See id. at 729; Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 248 (1990); Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279 (1987).
180. Cal. Fed. Sav., 479 U.S. at 279.
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men. 182 Without a clear standard, courts, like that in Johnson, may consider
a potentially complicated and subjective burden-shifting analysis. This is a
waste of judicial time and resources because this process could be avoided
if there was a clear federal standard.
V. THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT FAILS TO SERVE AS A
PROPER “PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY PERIOD” FOR THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
The purpose of the FMLA was not to designate an acceptable length of
disability leave a new mother may take. 183 Instead, it was passed to address
the failure of both Title VII and the PDA to address gender-based
discrimination in regards to benefits, especially pregnancy disability
leave. 184 Congress intentionally included the self-care provision in the
FMLA which states that a man or woman may take twelve weeks of unpaid
leave to take care of a serious personal health condition, such as childbirth,
to counter the stereotype that women take more leave than men. 185 By
creating an across-the-board benefit, Congress sought to ensure pregnancyrelated sick leave was no longer stigmatized. 186 Under the FMLA, both men
and women are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave. Therefore,
employers can no longer refuse to hire a woman in fear that she may take
maternity leave, because a male employee can take the same amount of
leave for a medical condition of his own, often without giving nine-months’
notice. 187 Because the purpose of the FMLA was to bridge the gender gap
between benefits, and not to establish a length of actual disability time, it is
improper to use the FMLA as a standard to establish an appropriate
pregnancy disability leave length standard.
Furthermore, not only was the FMLA not intended to establish a proper
length of maternity leave time, it does not cover the same employees as
Title VII. 188 Unlike Title VII, which applies to the vast majority of
employers in the United States, the FMLA only covers about sixty percent
of the American workforce. 189 This is because Title VII applies to “all
182. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (2012).
183. See Univ. of Texas at El Paso v. Herrera, 281 S.W.3d 575, 585 (Tex. App. 2008), rev’d on

other grounds, 322 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2010).
184. See id. (When creating the FMLA, “Congress sought to ensure that pregnancy-related sick
leave would no longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female
employees, and that employers could not evade leave obligations simply by hiring men . . . the
FMLA attacks the formerly state-sanctioned stereotype that women of child-bearing age are
absent more than other employees, thereby reducing employers’ incentives to engage in
discrimination by basing hiring and promotion decisions on stereotypes.”).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See generally Brusca, supra note 1, at 80–81 (discussing the narrow group of individuals
covered by the FMLA).
189. Id. at 80.
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private employers, state and local governments, and educational institutions
that employ more than 15 individuals.” 190 In contrast, the FMLA applies
only to employers that employ fifty or more individuals within a seventyfive mile radius. 191 For an employee to qualify for FMLA leave, the
employee must have worked for the employer for twelve months, worked at
least 1,250 hours for the employer in the twelve months immediately
preceding the requested leave time, and must be employed at one of the
employer’s locations that employs fifty employees within a seventy-five
mile radius. 192 Even if an employee meets all of these requirements, the
employer may still require the employee to use all of their accrued vacation
and sick leave during the FMLA leave period before officially taking
FMLA leave. 193 Although Congress did not intend the FMLA to designate
an appropriate length of maternity leave time, and although the FMLA does
not apply to forty percent of the American workforce, it remains the only
federal regulation of parental leave in existence in the United States. 194
A bill was unsuccessfully proposed in 2009, 195 and reintroduced in
2017, 196 which set a federally required length of maternity leave. 197 Instead
of creating a new law, Congress should amend the PDA to set an
appropriate length of disability leave time. Creating a standard of
“acceptable” pregnancy disability length may seem daunting at first because
the time needed to physically recover from pregnancy and childbirth may
vary greatly from woman to woman. 198 However, this should not prevent
Congress from creating a federal standard. Under the FMLA, Congress
created a standard twelve-week medical leave time, even though medical
conditions vary greatly in the amount of time needed to recover. For
example, both an individual recovering from a broken arm that required an
in-patient visit, and an individual recovering from a heart transplant, are
equally entitled to twelve weeks of FMLA leave, even though it can be
190. Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, THE U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, (Nov. 21, 2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html.
191. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012).
192. Id.; see also Brusca, supra note 1, at 79 (explaining the requirements that an individual
must fulfill in order for their leave to be covered by the FMLA).
193. Brusca, supra note 1, at 80.
194. Id. at 81.
195. Id. at 81.
196. Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2017, H.R. 1022, 115th Cong. (2017).
197. Both bills would only include federal employees, and therefore even fewer employees than
the FMLA or Title VII. Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2017, H.R. 1022, 115th
Cong. (2017); see also Brusca, supra note 1, at 81 (explaining the proposal and failure of the
Federal Employees Paid Leave Act of 2017).
198. See Young, supra note 3, at 1225 (“[T]here may be some legitimate uncertainty about the
scope of permissible ‘pregnancy disability leave.’ . . . Typical estimates of postpartum disability
cluster around six weeks, so employers may simply be erring to the safe side by providing eight or
even ten weeks disability leave.”); see generally McGovern, supra note 23, at 160 (identifying the
array of postpartum health concerns a woman may face, including recovery of reproductive
organs, infections, fatigue, and discomfort).
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argued their medical conditions vary in severity. Thus, the twelve-week
FMLA is just a baseline standard. Similarly, if Congress amended the PDA,
the amendment would create a baseline standard, not an absolute time
length intended to cover all women in every circumstance. Instead, it would
establish a threshold for courts and employers to structure their parental
leave policies.
The federal government’s failure to clearly define an acceptable length
of pregnancy disability leave, let alone require parental leave or paid
maternity leave, has caused states to enact parental leave policies of their
own. 199 California became the first state to institute a statewide family leave
policy in 2002 as part of its disability insurance program. 200 Since then,
several states have enacted parental leave legislation, and other states and
the District of Columbia currently have pending parental leave
legislation. 201 The new mixture of state parental leave laws, which vary
greatly, in addition to the conflicting federal court rulings, and EEOC
standards, creates a very disorderly and confusing picture of parental leave
in the United States and makes it difficult for employers to know what kind
of leave policies they must offer to comply with Title VII. This is because
Title VII is a federal statute. Not only do state laws lack clarification of
Title VII requirements, hypothetically, an employer could comply with a
state maternity leave law, but nonetheless have a policy that violates Title
VII. For example, a state could require employers to offer non-disability
leave to new mothers, but not new fathers. If an employer was to offer such
a plan, this could violate Title VII. Therefore, only an amendment to Title
VII is appropriate to clarify federal law.
Furthermore, state parental leave laws, similar to the FMLA, will not
apply to vast majority of the American workforce. State parental leave laws
will only apply to residents in that state, therefore, only a federal law can
reach the vast majority of American workers. Instead of proposing new
legislation to set a length of acceptable parental leave, which has now failed
twice, Congress must amend the PDA because it already directly addresses
parental leave and covers the vast majority of American workers and
employers.
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
CAREGIVER LEAVE
Parental leave is “unavoidably intermingled” with pregnancy disability
leave because all leave for new parents will ultimately be classified as
pregnancy disability leave or parental leave. 202 Therefore, even if employers
199. See Brusca, supra note 1, at 83.
200. Id.
201. Id. (noting that only California, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have paid parental leave

programs).
202. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 742 n. *5.
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create policies with no mention of sex, there is still the possibility that a
Title VII claim will arise. At both JP Morgan and Estée Lauder, the length
of leave that a new parent is granted is determined by the employee’s
classification as the primary or secondary caregiver of the child. The
lawsuits brought against JP Morgan and Estée Lauder highlight the problem
with this classification. 203 However, even though these policies did not
explicitly mention sex, the employers were susceptible to a Title VII
lawsuit because the policies had a disparate impact.
The plaintiffs claim that the leave policies at JP Morgan and Estée
Lauder violate Title VII because they automatically presume the mother to
be the primary caregiver and therefore provide women with a longer leave
time. 204 Under its policy, JP Morgan presumptively treats biological
mothers as primary caregivers and entitles them to sixteen weeks of paid
parental leave, while biological fathers are presumptively considered
secondary caregivers and are only given two weeks paid leave.205 A father
can only be recognized as a primary caregiver if his spouse or domestic
partner has returned to work, or if his spouse is physically unable to care for
the child. 206 Similarly, under the Estée Lauder policy, there are four kinds
of leave offered to new parents: maternity leave, adoption leave, primary
caregiver leave, and secondary caregiver leave. 207 Birth mothers
automatically receive six to eight weeks of medical leave, and then six
weeks of paid maternity leave. 208 Fathers, however, can only receive
secondary caregiver leave, which entitles them to two weeks of paid
leave. 209
Although the policies appear neutral because they do not explicitly
mention sex, they nonetheless expose the company to liability because the
policies offer parental leave, not pregnancy disability leave.210 The Third
Circuit has held that parental leave may not be longer for mothers than for
fathers. 211 In Schafer v. Board of Public Education, 212 the collective
bargaining agreement at issue stated, “all female teachers shall be entitled to
maternity leave,” and also provided that female teachers could take up to
one year of unpaid leave after the birth of a child “for personal reasons
203. EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by Petitioner, supra note 11, at 6; Rotondo v. JP Morgan
Charge by Petitioner, at 1.
204. Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner, at 1; EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by
Petitioner, supra note 11, at 7.
205. Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner, supra note 11, at 1.
206. Id.
207. EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by Petitioner, supra note 11, at 5.
208. Id. at 7.
209. Id.
210. Rotondo v. JP Morgan Charge by Petitioner, at 1; EEOC v. Estee Lauder Charge by
Petitioner, supra note 11, at 6.
211. See Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Sch. Dist. Of Pittsburgh, PA, 903 F.2d 243, 247
(1990).
212. Id. at 245 n. 1.
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relating to childbearing or childrearing.” 213 After a male teacher was denied
his request for a year of unpaid leave to care for his newborn, he filed suit
with the EEOC, claiming this policy was a prima facie discrimination
case. 214 The Third Circuit agreed and held that an employer may not have a
separate parental leave policy for men and women. 215
VII.
REASONS EMPLOYERS OFFER PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY CAREGIVER DISTINCT LEAVE POLICIES
In both the JP Morgan and Estée Lauder lawsuits, the longer leave for
new biological mothers would have been permissible if it was categorized
as disability leave. This is because under Guerra, pregnancy disability leave
may be longer than regular disability leave and does not need to be given to
males. 216 But, the courts must still first determine how long the length of
this disability leave may be. In a footnote in Johnson, the court reasoned
that employers are not properly suited to determine when disability should
end and caregiving leave begin, and that this determination is “properly left
to Congress or another legislative entity.” 217
There are three primary reasons companies continue to offer primary
and secondary caregiving distinct leave, even though such policies make the
companies susceptible to Title VII suits. 218 First, an employer may be
legitimately confused and uncertain about permissible “pregnancy disability
leave.” 219 Employers, many of whom are not medical practitioners, and are
unfamiliar with the time required for woman’s body to recover from giving
birth, may legitimately believe a woman’s body needs more than twelve
weeks to recover. 220 Even if such extended leave is well intended, like the
policy in International Union v. Johnson, 221 good intentions do not remove
Title VII lawsuit susceptibility. In International Union,222 the Supreme
Court held that a pregnancy policy that discriminates in practice, even if
well intended, will violate Title VII. 223 In that case, a battery manufacturer
prohibited “women capable of bearing children” from holding positions in
the company that might exposure them to lead, because exposure to lead
might hurt a fetus. 224 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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the company had a reasonable purpose for this exclusion: to protect unborn
children. 225 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding the policy was
discriminatory under Title VII because it did not apply to fertile male
employees, but only fertile female employees.226 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned “the absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy.” 227 Likewise, “the benefice of
an employer’s purpose does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit
gender-based policy is sex discrimination under § 703(a).” 228
Although a court has not stated a specific amount of time that will be
considered reasonable disability leave—although under the Schaefer
analysis, a reasonable amount of time is at least less than a year—the more
weeks granted in excess of an employer’s traditional disability leave policy,
the more susceptible a policy is to a Title VII suit. 229
Second, employers may believe they have a competitive advantage by
offering generous leave policies. 230 There has been an increased focus in
recent years to allow time to learn how to be a parent for women, but such
an allowance has not been made for men. 231 Thus, to be competitive,
employers create longer leave policies for women. Employers that do this,
like Schaefer, 232 fail to recognize that fathers also need additional time to
adjust to parenthood and bond with their new child. 233
Third, it is possible that employers are simply unaware of the Title VII
liabilities their policies create.234 Employers may believe that by including a
primary and secondary caregiver language, instead of a mother and father
distinction, removes sex discrimination liability.
Amending the PDA to create a specified pregnancy disability leave
period standard would address the reasons employers offer “primary” and
“secondary” caregiver leave. 235 First, the confusion regarding the amount of
disability leave time that can be offered would be clearly removed. 236
Second, companies could still offer competitive leave policies, and
employers would have confidence that these policies are in compliance with
Title VII. For example, an employer could still offer longer leave time to a
new mother, by offering her both disability leave and parental leave. The
only change would be that employers would know at which point disability
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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Id. at 197.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
See Young, supra note 3, at 1218–19.
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See Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the Law
Firm’s Failure of the Family, 53 STAN L. REV. 967, 978 (2001).
232. See Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of School Dist., 903 F.2d 243, 247 (3rd. Cir. 1990).
233. Cunningham, supra note 231, at 972.
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235. See id.
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leave ends and parental leave begins, and consequently, how much leave
time must be offered to fathers. 237
CONCLUSION
Nearly forty years after the first pregnancy-related discrimination case
regarding Title VII was filed, employers still struggle to create parental
leave policies that comply with the Act, as demonstrated by the lawsuits
against JP Morgan and Estée Lauder this summer. Forty years of litigation
and draining judicial resources is enough. Current federal legislation is
insufficient to establish a federal standard regarding acceptable pregnancy
disability leave length. Specifically, the twelve-week medical leave
standard in the FMLA is improper because the Act does not encompass all
employees covered by Title VII, nor was it entitled to. After Congress once
again failed this year to pass a federal maternity leave bill, it is clear that the
only way to create a concrete standard defining the length of pregnancy
disability leave is to amend the PDA. The creation of a clear, concrete
standard would also address the primary reasons employers have policies
that fail to comply with Title VII because the standard would allow
employer to know exactly what leave policies it is required to offer and how
it must adjust its “competitive” leave polices to give more leave time to
women if it desires. Indeed, a clear federal standard would provide the
guideline courts have requested. 238 This Note calls on Congress to amend
Title VII to clearly state an acceptable length of pregnancy disability leave,
and employers to abandon “primary” and “secondary caregiver” policies for
policies based on pregnancy disability and parental leave.
Krista Gay *

237. See id.
238. Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 742 n. 5 (8th Cir. 2004).
* B.S. B.A. John Brown University, Siloam Springs, AR. This Note is dedicated to my
grandmother, Donna Currier, and my late grandfather, Donald Currier, whose love,
encouragement, and sacrifices have made all of my dreams possible; and to Trisha Posey,
my former professor, mentor, and friend, whose guidance has been invaluable during law
school. A special thanks to Caitlin Baranowski, Echo Wang, and the staff of the Journal for
their hard work and advice on this Note.

